# 1AC

### Moazzam Begg 1AC

#### In an interview earlier this year Moazzam Begg, a former detainee at Guantanamo Bay, shared his experiences at the prison:

(Moazzam Begg, former Gitmo detainee, Interviewed by Global News network RT, FORMER DETAINEE OF GUANTANAMO “‘Everybody in Guantanamo has been tortured or abused’ - former detainee” July 6th http://rt.com/op-edge/gitmo-strike-torture-inmate-724/)

“I was subjected to the sounds of a woman screaming, I was led to believe that my wife was being tortured,” Moazzam Begg, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee has shared with RT. The former inmate has shed light on some of the torturous detention techniques at Guantanamo. They include, being cavity searched and given directions on how to commit suicide. Despite being physically and psychologically tortured by the guards in the US prison, Begg says prisoners find it in themselves to forgive the soldiers. RT: What was your own stay like at the prison? Moazzam Begg: Most of my time was spent in solitary confinement which meant being in a a cell that measured 6 foot by 8 foot which was windowless at that time, I did not have access to any meaningful communication with my family, I had no knowledge whether I was ever going to get charged or not, which I was not. At that time no lawyers were allowed. So for two and a half years there was no concept of facing any legal proceedings. But now the situation has changed a lot. RT: During that time would you claim that you were tortured or abused? MB: I say that everybody who’s been held in Guantanamo has been tortured or abused in one way. When I was first taken into custody, it was the most torturous process I think that any person can imagine. It meant being stripped naked, it meant your body being searched, cavity searched as they called it. Having your hair shaved off, being punched and kicked and being spat upon. On one occasion it was in background facility before I went to Guantanamo, I was subjected to the sounds of a woman screaming, I was led to believe that my wife was being tortured. So everybody in a sense is being tortured and the worst sort of torture is the psychological of course sort in which you are in solitary confinement torture unable to know what you have done for which you’re paying the ultimate price which is your freedom. RT: One prisoner claims that he and others have been sexually assaulted during searches. Have you ever witnessed anything like that? MB: Certainly, every prisoner will say that he has had invasive cavity searches. Across the board 779 men if you were to ask them, did this happen to them, they would say yes it happened to us at various junctures of detention. The particular prisoner, his name is Younous Chekkouri , he is from Morocco, is saying precisely this, but of course it is a violation of his dignity. I believe that the term rape has been used in a broader sense, meaning that objects have been inserted into a person which are extremely painful and degrading too. RT: We've heard an ex-military official say the prison's a recruiting ground for al-Qaeda. Would you agree? MB: It is bizarre, President Obama has recently visited Robben Island and he actually was in a cell where Nelson Mandela was. He actually wrote in the visitor’s book that nothing could break the strength of the human spirit, not even shackles or chains. But he forgot to add - unless you happened to be in our shackles and chains and in our cells. Of course, this is the sort of thing that will make people angry. But if you look at over 600 prisoners that have been released from Guantanamo, almost everybody has returned not to begin a life of terrorism or recidivism, as they call it, but actually stretch out their hands toward former Guantanamo soldiers, guards and interrogators. I had former Guantanamo guards coming to my house and meet the children that they prevented me from seeing when they were born. This is the sort of nature of the Guantanamo prisoners, we are extremely forgiving. RT: It seems that hunger strikers in Guantanamo are prepared to die. Did you think you'd die there? MB: I think many times that the administration there suggested to us, I was just once told that I had a thought about committing a suicide and they told me how I could commit suicide if I felt so down. Clearly the prisoners have moved along since that point, but clearly prisoners have died, nine people have died in Guantanamo. If the hunger strikes continue in the way that they are, then force-feeding is not the solution. The solution is to give them justice and that is the reason why they are doing it. They are not doing it because of all the abuses, those are peripheral, they are doing it because they have been held for almost 12 years now without charge or trial in any legal, normative system.

#### Begg’s experience is illustrative of Guantanamo’s existence at a unique intersection of contemporary American militarism and racism--- it should be rejected

Hudson 2013 (The Continuing US War on the Darker Skinned Tuesday, 06 August 2013 09:19 By Adam Hudson, “The Continuing US War on the Darker Skinned” on August 6th of this year, Truthout )


The notorious US military base and penal colony in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, serves as a stark example of militarized institutional racism. There, 166 people are indefinitely detained, but 2 might be returned to Algeria. Of those, 86 are cleared for release, but remain detained. While a few are being tried in military commissions (which are ineffective at upholding rights of the accused), the vast majority are held without charge or trial. According to Guantanamo chief prosecutor US Army Brigadier General Mark Martins, they are "detained until the end of hostilities" against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and "associated forces," which could be decades from now. The majority of Guantanamo detainees are, thus, prisoners of war in an endless war. Indefinite detention violates international human rights law. Yet, along with military commissions, it's been supported by President Barack Obama. This indefinite detention, along with the squalid conditions of their confinement, has led around 70 detainees to engage in a hunger strike that has lasted nearly half a year, so far. Of those, around four dozen are being force-fed, a brutal procedure in which a tube is shoved up a person's nose and down into their stomachs to feed them a supplement. Force-feeding, according to many doctors and human rights advocates, violates medical ethics and amounts to torture. The vast majority of the detainees are Muslim, mostly from Yemen with others from places like Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The detention center at Guantanamo is one chapter in the long saga of US militarism against the world's majority - non-white, non-European peoples. Racism is power and justifies war Racism is a system of power, hierarchy, inequality and oppression reinforced by racist ideology to keep it going. Its roots lie in slavery and the genocide of the native Americans. Its continuation is exemplified by current inequalities between blacks and whites in wealth, employment, and other areas of life - with blacks positioned far below whites in the socioeconomic ladder. Racist ideology is manifested by negative perceptions of nonwhite people. A 2008 study done by psychologists at Pennsylvania State University, Stanford University and University of California at Berkeley showed that many white Americans associate black people with apes. Coauthor Jennifer Eberhardt, a Stanford psychology professor, remarked, "African-Americans are still dehumanized; we're still associated with apes in this country. That association can lead people to endorse the beating of black suspects by police officers, and I think it has a lot of other consequences that we have yet to uncover." A related consequence lies in war, which racism ideologically justifies. To kill people in wars, the designated enemy must be dehumanized. Using racialized differences (culture, skin color, ancestry, etc.) is a very common way to dehumanize and subjugate a population. They are seen as "others" who are "not like us," thus, apt for killing. The War on Terror is a continuation of US wars against darker-skinned peoples. Today's "enemy" are Muslims, usually (though not always) darker-skinned people from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Depicted as "terrorists" in popular discourse, these communities face continuing Islamophobia, marginalization and dehumanization. Since Guantanamo houses detainees who are mostly, if not all, Muslim and nonwhite, it is an example of institutional racism within the global war on terror. But it goes deeper than that. While Guantanamo is notorious for indefinite detention, military commissions, torture, and the hunger strike, what's commonly forgotten is that it is a US naval base that's been on Cuban soil for more than a hundred years. In addition to detaining people in dismal conditions, it also used as a refueling station for US ships and a base for counter-narcotics operations throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. Many of these operations are carried out by the Coast Guard stationed at Guantanamo. Foreign workers exploited in Guantanamo, other US bases On the 45-square-mile base, there are suburban-style homes for troops and military families, restaurants, bars, a supermarket, Subway,

McDonald's, a movie theater, occasional balls for soldiers on the base and other amenities of a typical city or military base. If you're there long enough, you wouldn't think there's a prison housing hundreds of "suspected terrorists" a few miles from where you're at. During my two weeks of reporting in Guantanamo, I noticed many of the workers on the base were Filipino and Afro-Caribbean. They worked as baggers, cashiers, restaurant servers, repair people (I remember seeing a few Filipino workers repair the air conditioning in the media operations center where journalists work), construction workers, grass mowers, sanitation workers and other service providers. In military jargon, these workers are known as "third-country nationals" or TCNs. In her book Guantánamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution, Professor Jana K. Lipman explains that in the beginning, many of the workers at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station were local Cubans, some British West Indians, Puerto Ricans and Asians. But the 1959 Cuban revolution ended contact between the American naval base and the rest of Cuba. To replace those workers, the United States imported laborers from Jamaica and the Philippines. Columbia University researcher Darryl Li noted that "In the past decade, the Pentagon's privatization drives have dramatically increased its global reliance on TCN [third-country national] labor." At Guantanamo, many of these workers work for contractors like Bremcor and BDRC. In March of 2002, the recruitment firm Anglo-European Services, which is tied to Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), formerly a subsidiary of the American oil corporation Halliburton Company (of which Dick Cheney was former chairman and CEO), "sent 250 Filipino construction workers to build additional detention cells for US-held terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba," reported the Asia Times in July 2006. The workers "were allegedly slipped out of the Ninoy Quino International Airport without passing through standard immigration procedures" and left "on a chartered flight to Cuba." Both the United States and Philippine governments kept the recruitment "under wraps." But Guantanamo is not the only US military base to employ foreign workers. They're employed by several US government contractors like KBR and DynCorp International, through tertiary subcontractors (mainly from the Middle East), to do logistical work at many military bases, such as in Afghanistan. These workers hail from countries like the Philippines, Fiji, Nepal and Bangladesh. In a detailed June 2011 exposé, The New Yorker reported that they are "the Pentagon's invisible army: more than seventy thousand cooks, cleaners, construction workers, fast-food clerks, electricians, and beauticians from the world's poorest countries who service US military logistic contracts." While the "expansion of private-security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan is well known," says journalist Sarah Stillman, who traveled to US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan to write the story, "armed security personnel account for only about 16 percent of the over-all contracting force. The vast majority - more than 60 percent of the total in Iraq - aren't hired guns but hired hands." According to Stillman, "These workers, primarily from South Asia and Africa, often live in barbed-wire compounds on US bases, eat at meager chow halls, and host dance parties featuring Nepalese romance ballads and Ugandan church songs. A large number are employed by fly-by-night subcontractors who are financed by the American taxpayer but who often operate outside the law." Labor protections in these environments are virtually nonexistent. Many workers interviewed for the report "recount having been robbed of wages, injured without compensation, subjected to sexual assault and held in conditions resembling indentured servitude by their subcontractor bosses." Most of the workers make a couple hundred dollars a month. Their abysmal treatment has led to many "food riots in Pentagon subcontractor camps, some involving more than a thousand workers." At bases in countries like Afghanistan, foreign workers face war-zone dangers, namely being killed or injured from explosions and attacks. Thousands of contractors have been killed and injured. According to the New Yorker report, "private contractor losses are now on a par with those of US troops in [Iraq and Afghanistan] war zones." However, since deaths and injuries of foreign workers are rarely counted, the actual toll could be higher. An ACLU report, released last year, highlighted that the system by which US contractors employ foreign workers amounts to trafficking and forced labor. The US government gives a contract to a primary contractor. Rather than hire directly, that contractor contracts subcontractors to do the job. Those subcontractors pay recruiters who recruit foreign workers in their home countries and make them pay exorbitant recruitment fees to get a job. Those workers are normally tricked into thinking they'll work at one (usually nicer) place with promises of a higher salary, only to wind up somewhere like Iraq or Afghanistan making low wages. According to the report, "the vast majority of TCNs ultimately earn between $150-$500 per month," close to $1,800-$6,000 annually. Such coercion, abuses, "deceptive hiring practices, exploitation, and abuse of power" amount to trafficking, thereby violating international and US antitrafficking laws, according to the ACLU. Moreover, it is an affront to basic human rights. This is where the forces of corporate globalization, institutional racism and militarism conjoin. Foreign workers are exploited by private companies to work on US military bases. The exploitation of foreign workers may not be racist by intent. However, it is institutionally racist in effect because of whom it impacts and exploits - black and brown people from poorer countries. Intersections between racism and war - at home and abroad Militarism is a system of projecting aggressive military power to promote state interests, such as national defense, countering adversaries, or control of vital resources and markets. It largely subjugates people of color around the world. Today's imperial landscape is marked by conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - which are winding down - and the expansion of asymmetric wars through assassination, raids by special operations forces, air wars, proxy wars, private military contractors, and drone strikes. These asymmetric wars are occurring in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, but expanding to other areas, particularly in Africa. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan killed hundreds of thousands to millions of people, along with displacing over four million, destroying infrastructure and leaving many Iraqis with birth defects and cancer thanks to depleted uranium used by US armed forces. US covert wars in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed thousands with deaths continuing to rise. Many of them are civilians or unknown persons. Only 2 percent of those killed by drone strikes in Pakistan are high-level terrorist leaders. The rest are civilians and unidentified or low-level Afghan and Pakistani militants, according to McClatchy. As they inflict death and injury, US drone strikes have also terrorized and radicalized civilian populations in Pakistan. The victims of wars, occupations, bombings, proxy wars and militarized neoliberal exploitation are predominantly people from darker-skinned, non-European countries, who constitute the world's majority, but neither possess much of the world's wealth nor control the global economy (that power lies in Europe and North America). A list of US military interventions from 1890 to 2011 by Professor Zoltan Grossman of Evergreen State College shows that most US wars occurred in Latin America, the Arab World and many parts of Asia. They include the massacre at Wounded Knee, Spanish-American War, the Vietnam War, coups in Iran, Iraq, and Chile, backing the Contras in Nicaragua during the 1980s, and the 1976-92 proxy war in Angola. Because of whom it oppresses, militarism is systematically racist. Militarism also impacts people of color, especially black people, at home. According to a thorough report done by the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, one black person is killed every 28 hours by law enforcement or armed vigilantes. Most of the time, the victims are unarmed and use of force was excessive. Police dehumanize black people by suspecting they are potential threats in the same way soldiers dehumanize "the enemy" overseas. Hence police typically say they "felt threatened" before they shot a black person. State and vigilante violence against African-Americans is not new. It dates back to slave catchers and lynchings of black people in the South. But this system has grown to new heights with the militarization of domestic police forces. Police are given military weapons, equipment, tactics, and training through grants, Pentagon giveaways, and, after 9/11, Department of Homeland Security grants. This started under the Reagan administration and has continued under Obama. Little mention in liberal media Many purportedly anti-racist liberal talking heads and media outlets tend to under-appreciate the connections between racism and militarism. One would expect them as people with knowledge about race relations to highlight this connection when national security stories come up. However, they tend to drop the ball. Melissa Harris-Perry, a political science professor at Tulane University and MSNBC show host, specializes in African-American politics and provides a liberal perspective on American race relations. She spoke out against the Zimmerman verdict and provides insightful coverage on issues like the infringement of voting rights in communities of color. But her views on Obama's militarism range from blasé to apologetic. Last November, when discussing drone strikes on her show, Harris-Perry asked journalist Allison Kilkenny and MSNBC host Chris Hayes, "Make a case to me about why they're problematic because I'm not sure that I agree." Harris-Perry brought up police shootings of black youth in the United States in response to Hayes criticizing the death of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a 16-year-old American citizen killed by a US drone strike in Yemen in 2011. Rather than seize the opportunity to make the connection between domestic institutionalized racist violence and American militarism, she used it to buttress her nonchalance on the issue of drone strikes. Touré, another MSNBC commentator, is also liberal on race issues. But he's hawkish when it comes to drone strikes and assassination. Touré regularly comes to the Obama administration's defense on their belligerent counterterrorism policies. Last February, on Twitter, Touré said "Obama as Commander in Chief is tasked with leading our war against Al Qaeda. He can and [sic] should kill [al-Qaeda] leaders whenever possible." On The Cycle, he expanded his argument, "But we are at war with al-Qaeda right now. And if you join al-Qaeda, you lose the right to be an American; you lose the right to due process; you declare yourself an enemy of this nation. And you are committing treason" - even though the Constitution grants due process for those who commit treason. Then again, this is pretty much normal for a network that functions as the Obama administration's Pravda. The Root and The Grio are two large black media outlets; The Root, is owned by The Washington Post; and The Grio is owned by NBC News. They provide neither substantial coverage of foreign policy issues nor deeper analysis of the intersections between racism and empire. What one does get, however, is a lot of support for Obama. Contrast this with Black Agenda Report - a black leftist news and analysis website - or Pambazuka News - a Pan-Africanist online weekly newsletter - and the coverage is far different. Along with substantive critiques of the Obama administration's transgressions, there's regular critical analysis of domestic politics, foreign affairs, and the connections between institutional racism and Western imperialism. However, sites like Black Agenda Report and Pambazuka News are independent and have less exposure than The Root, The Grio, or MSNBC, due to the latter's corporate ownership. This raises the issue of how corporate media dilute the wider discourse on race relations. That is a problem because it reveals a blind spot in understanding about issues of race and national security. It leaves certain realities in the dark, such as the plight of foreign workers on American military bases. Highlighting the connections can add deeper context to problems, such as the killing of Trayvon Martin. His death was the byproduct of a militarized system of racism that allows a neighborhood watchman to carry a gun and shoot anyone (especially black teenagers) he deems threatening, with impunity. Examining the real connections between racism and militarism provides better understanding of the issues at stake. Such analysis is more likely to be found in independent black journalistic outlets than corporate media.

#### Unchecked, US militarism causes endless violence and threatens the “very fate of the earth”

Boggs 2004 “Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War,” page 1, google books

PRINTER’S NOTE: IF YOU ARE READING THIS IN DRAFT VIEW, THERE IS A SCREENSHOT CARD HERE



#### In this context Jeff and I advocate the restriction of the President of the United States’ war powers authority to indefinitely detain.

#### Advocating against indefinite detention in college debate rounds, specifically by presenting Moazzam Begg’s story, is empowering and spurs real world change

English et al 2007 (Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief & Carly Woods, June 2007, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4:2, pp. 221–225)

The shadow of 1954 suggests that academic debating in a post-9/11 political environment could be hazardous. The New York City high school debaters described above cer- tainly had cause for alarm. But police confiscation of their speaking briefs was more ac- cident than trend. A closer look at contemporary academic debate reveals features that make it seem markedly less subversive than its 1954 version. This year’s intercollegiate policy debate topic calls on affirmative teams to overrule one of four Supreme Court decisions, including Ex parte Quirin, the precedent frequently invoked to justify homeland security policies such as military tribunals for Guantanamo detainees.8 In arguing to overturn Quirin, debaters employ a variety of approaches. Most teams contend that the Supreme Court’s 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, while help- ful, does not go far enough in limiting the scope of military commissions. In this view, leaving Quirin on the books enables a troubling expansion of presidential power, with the potential to destroy transatlantic relations and abrogate US obligations to the Geneva Convention. Others use testimony, narratives, and poetry from ex-detainees like Afghan poet Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost and British memoirist Moazzam Begg to highlight the human rights abuses and torture allegations at Guantanamo Bay. If this sounds radical, consider that such cases have been met with objections from negative opponents that piecemeal reforms are cosmetic drops in the bucket, with durable systemic change only likely to come from more revolutionary measures such as presidential impeachment, an- archy, or world government.¶ Today’s intercollegiate debaters find themselves in a political landscape resembling 1954 in several respects. Once again, we find prominent political figures attempting to define the contours of public debate by portraying critics as unpatriotic. Vice President Cheney says that ‘‘disagreement, argument and debate are the essentials of democracy,’’ yet stipulates that charges of pre-war intelligence manipulation are ‘‘dishonest and rep- rehensible.’’9 Such contortions are typical examples of how skillfully McCarthy’s ide- ological descendants attack the process of democracy in the name of democracy. The conservative punditry also does its part. While Ann Coulter accuses Iraq war critics of treason, David Horowitz revives fears of a liberal (and therefore ‘‘dangerous’’) academic elite poisoning the minds of America’s young adults. Despite these and countless other examples of McCarthyist tendencies, many directed specifically at academia, there has been no outcry about college students ‘‘taking the side of terrorists’’ in competitive de- bate tournaments. Why?¶ One answer is that intercollegiate policy debate has become remarkably isolated and esoteric. Competitive pressures have molded the activity into a highly technical art form, where students argue in jargon at breakneck speeds that regularly top 300 words per minute. Because so few people can participate in these debates, virtually no one observes them; untrained spectators are often baffled. The coin has two sides, for the isolation of this form of debate both protects it from criticism and prevents it from having a broader social effect. The result is an odd oasis of intellectual ferment bearing resemblance to the carefully demarcated ‘‘free speech zones’’ that dot the periphery of today’s controversial public events.¶ Second, while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 contro- versy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the de- bate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a ‘‘technology’’ of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCar- thy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative con- ception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural tech- nologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epito- mizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democ- racy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justifi- cation for violence.¶ It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expand- ing American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices re- shaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13¶ Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an under- graduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dart- mouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch com- mitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal re- counts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14¶ The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understand- ing of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security pol- icies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the re- fusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimen- tation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating prac- tice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

#### And, in the context of our privilege as white, middle class, heterosexual males, advocating against instances of racism is vital to an interrogation and rehabilitation of white identity

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

This is not something that most “good” white people want to hear. Wise recounts a story that underscores this point, as well as confirms Marcano’s insight into the lack of trust across race lines. When giving a presentation on whiteness to a predominantly white college audience, a young white woman asked Wise how his work was received by black people and admitted that she didn’t think she could do the same sort of work because black people wouldn’t trust her. Wise replied that while there occasionally was some mistrust, he never felt hated or resented once black people had seen him work and “walk the walk,” not just “talk the talk.” At that point, an extremely agitated black woman raised her hand and responded, “Make NO mistake . . . we do hate you and we don’t trust you, not for one minute!” (Wise 2005, 97). The young white woman was so distressed that she nearly fell apart. The black woman’s response apparently confirmed all her worst fears as a “good” white person. Wise, however, calmly replied to the black woman that he was sorry to hear this, but it was okay since he ultimately wasn’t fighting racism for the sake of nonwhite people. Upon hearing this, the entire audience snapped to attention as if a bomb had been dropped in the room, and even the agitated black woman looked puzzled. So Wise (2005, 98) continued, “I mean no disrespect by saying that. . . . It’s just that I don’t view it as my job to fight racism so as to save you from it. That would be paternalistic. . . . I fight [racism] because it’s a sickness in my community, and I’m trying to save myself from it.”¶ On a dominant understanding of morality, Wise’s reply appears to selfishly care for himself and his racial group more than he cares about the black woman and other black people. This is why his audience was shocked by his reply to the black woman’s mistrust. In addition to being uncaring and selfish, Wise doesn’t prioritize the establishment of close, trusting relationships between himself and other people of color as a goal, or even a means of his activist work. On a conventional understanding of how white antiracism should operate, the distance Wise allows between himself and people of color makes his activism ineffective at best, and scandalous at worst. But we can view Wise’s reply and his activist work through the lens of a different ethos, one that encourages white people’s “selfish” attention to their own race and understands the importance [End Page 34] of white self-love to their work for racial justice. Wise is fighting for white people’s racial health, rather than their racial goodness, and he sees that their improved health will make them better able to join with communities of color in a relationship of genuine respect, rather than paternalistic domination.¶ “Selfishly” cleaning up their own house is one of the best ways that white people today can contribute to racial justice and transform the meaning and effects of whiteness. In Lucius Outlaw’s (2004) terms, it is the way that whiteness can be “rehabilitated,” or returned to a condition of good health. I’m not sure that whiteness has ever been very healthy, as I think Outlaw would agree, so the return here is very much in question. But the sickness and need for better health are not. White people have been ill from white domination for centuries. If they are to recover, they need answers to the question of what a healthier whiteness might be, answers, in Outlaw’s (2004, 161) words, “that must be taken up and lived by folks who identify as ‘white.’” This is not work white people can ask or demand that people of color do for them, which is not to say that white people don’t have a great deal to learn about themselves from nonwhite people.14 While they cannot do it in a white solipsistic vacuum, white people need to develop a new ethos for their white identities. No one else can live their whiteness for them. So what will they—we, I—do with it? I think the best answers to this question will be ones that emerge apart from the dominance of white guilt and shame. By developing a bestowing self-love that helps transform whiteness, white people can make positive and ongoing contributions to struggles for racial justice.15

#### Our advocacy is an example of a positive affect approach to white antiracism--- it’s a prerequisite to transcending the history of white domination

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

This description might make it sound as if interrupting negative affects with living attention always is warm, cuddly, and pleasant, but it isn’t. One reason is that giving living attention to a person is not necessarily the same thing as sympathizing with the affects that grip her (Brennan 2004, 121). A friend might be resentfully indignant and want you to share in her indignation when the best thing for her would be for you lovingly to refuse to become vengefully angry and instead to help her gain a different perspective on her situation. This refusal can bring about more anger, turning the experience into a brutal process in which the strong person is beaten by waves of negative affect when the angry friend does not lower her defensive shields. In those situations, the strong person rightly tries “not to continue the transmission of negative affect; to stop it before it can be passed on or back.” Stopping it, however, means “absorb[ing] and transmut[ing] that affect,” and doing that can “give rise to a conflict between mental health (do not allow yourself to be dumped on) and spiritual health (do not dump back)” (2004, 124–25). The dangers to the strong that concerned Nietzsche are real, given that the strong often are called upon to be the recycling centers for negative affects. Dump your negative affects here and they can be converted into positive ones! Or at least they will be defused by being dumped on someone who won’t return [End Page 29] them. But the question for the strong person then becomes how to be continually dumped on without turning into a cesspool of negative affects oneself. Absorbing and transmitting negative affects can help transform the world, as Brennan claims, but, “it requires subjecting oneself to eddies or even torrents of affects, while somehow maintaining equilibrium. Such is the practice of souls who, when assailed by envy or contempt or rage do not take it personally, for they know that these are forces that possess even the finest souls” (2004, 135). The person who understands the complex causes and situations that produce negative affects can avoid taking negative affects personally even when they are directed at her. This sort of understanding is not the mark of a powerful person, as if understanding were a sign that represented power. It is the power itself of a very strong person.7¶ White people need to develop this kind of strength—and it is not only white supremacists who are weak, but also so-called non- or antiracist white people, who tend to be part of a white middle class that sees themselves as the “good” whites. “Good” middle-class white people generally lack the strength to interrupt racialized cycles of negative affects and generate positive affects instead. As a result of their weakness, they often dump responsibility for racism on lower- and working-class white people, who are posited as the true source of ongoing racial injustice. Lower-class white people allegedly are the “bad” (= racist) white people who are too unintelligent or unenlightened to know that people of color aren’t inferior to white people. With their disdain, scorn, and even hatred of “white trash,” middle-class white people exploit class differences among whites to efface their own complicity in racism and white domination.

#### This isn’t just some white dudes’ vanity project--- re-forming the white identity is a necessary prerequisite to conquering white anti-blackness and other forms of racism

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

So much the worse for white people, we might think. But although understandable, this response would be misguided since white people’s psychosomatic depletion has implications for the well-being of others. Put succinctly, white people’s unhealthiness helps fuel their abuse and domination of people of color. It thus matters to struggles for racial justice whether white people are psychosomatically healthy and strong. It matters which affects, emotions, and passions fund white people’s actions in general, and their work for racial justice in particular. In this paper, I will draw from Friedrich Nietzsche, Teresa Brennan, and other scholars to explain the ontological and power-full aspects of affect, touching briefly on the toxicity of white guilt and shame and focusing especially on the healthiness of what Nietzsche calls a bestowing self-love. I will argue that in the context of white people’s contributions to racial justice movements, a positive effect of their bestowing self-love is that white people will be more likely and better able to clean up their own house, to stop fleeing themselves through the use of people of color as a site of white racial redemption. The upshot of my paper is a call for an ethos for white antiracists that is not primarily grounded in enervating affects such as guilt and shame. An ethos of white antiracism based instead on vitalizing affects such as self-love will help white people make more effective and sustainable contributions to racial justice movements.

#### We’re obviously not saying that white people will be the saviors of the antiracist movement but we do have a unique, positive role to play

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

One last comment before I turn to the relationship between affect, power, and political action. I do not think that racial justice movements are dependent [End Page 22] on white people for their success. Far more often than not, white people are part of the problem, not the solution, when it comes to ending white domination. The struggles, protests, and demands of people of color have been and most likely will continue to be the main motor driving racial justice movements. But white people can play a positive role in those movements as well. In fact, I think they have a small, but somewhat unique role to play given the persistence of de facto racial segregation in workplaces, neighborhoods, school systems, and so on. Just as feminist movements need men who are willing to speak out against sexism and male privilege (hooks 1984, 67–81; Katz 2006)—especially in all-male settings such as locker rooms, fraternity houses, and so on—racial justice movements need white people who are willing to speak and act against white racism when they encounter it in their families, neighborhoods, workplaces, etc. As important as women are to feminist change, eliminating sexism should not be reduced to “women’s work.” Likewise, white people who care about racial justice should not sit back and wait for people of color to clean up the mess that white people have made. White people need to make a positive contribution to racial justice and, as I will argue, their contribution needs to be something other than a short-lived gesture that ultimately serves to assuage white guilt rather than eliminate racial injustice. The question then becomes: How are white people more likely to engage in sustained political action that actually counters white domination? The answer lies, to a large extent, in the affects that constitute them.

#### Any state link is seriously grasping for straws--- Talking about a problem caused by the state does not legitimize the state

Frost 1996 (Mervyn Frost, Professor at the University of Kent, “Ethics In International Relations A Constitutive Theory,” pp. 90-91)

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan's approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded. By having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus, for example, any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.

# 2AC

### 2AC Ressentiment Add-On

#### The 1AC Sullivan cards are a straight turn to their ressentiment args--- White people need to clean up our own house but NOT just out of guilt or pity for people of color--- only this opens the possibility for genuine self-love

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

Instead of being constituted primarily by white guilt and shame, white people who want to work toward racial justice need to be fueled by a bestowing love for or affirmation of themselves and other white people. I deliberately say “love themselves and other white people,” rather than “love other people, white and nonwhite” because I’m concerned about cross-racial, universal love being used by white people as an evasion of the meaning and effects of their whiteness and thus as an extension of their white privilege. Let me be clear that I am not arguing that white people and people of color should never love each other. What I am arguing is that white people need to stop overly focusing on people of color when they consider how to combat racial injustice. More than anything, white people need to turn to themselves and clean up their own house. I realize that this suggestion might seem to only exacerbate white domination, white racism, and the specific problem of the white quest for racial salvation. Aren’t white people already too focused on themselves? Don’t they need to think more about the plight and lives of people of color? Won’t loving or affirming themselves only increase the amount of white hubris, white pride, white selfishness, and white supremacy that exists in the world today?¶ The answer to these questions is no, or at least, not necessarily. This is not because white people have nothing in their racial past or present to feel ashamed about. They do. I am not claiming that white people should never feel guilty or ashamed about their whiteness or their white history. What I am claiming is that guilt and shame should not be the primary affects that constitute a white person’s relationship to her racial identity. While white people myopically have engaged in what Adrienne Rich (1979, 306) calls “white solipsism,” in which only white people and their interests are recognized or seen as important, the best corrective for white solipsism is not necessarily for white people to do the opposite and “selflessly” focus only on people of color. [End Page 26] White self-denial and self-hatred can be the flip side of the same coin of white solipsism, after all. What is needed instead is for white people to develop a different kind of relationship to their whiteness.¶ In my view, an increase of white “selfishness” is needed to help prevent white involvement in antiracist movements from becoming a disguised form of condescending charity toward people of color. As Nietzsche’s Zarathustra explains, the selflessness of those who would try to help others first often is a covert form of self-hatred. Speaking to the weak, Zarathustra charges “your love of your neighbors is your bad love of yourselves. You flee to your neighbor away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue of it; but I see through your ‘selflessness’” (Nietzsche 1969, 86). Nietzsche’s harsh indictment of Christian forms of charity is echoed by W. E. B. Du Bois’s scathing criticism of white philanthropists who think of themselves as uplifting poor, ignoble people of color across the world. As Du Bois (1999, 18–19) bitingly charges, these “worthy souls in whom consciousness of high descent brings burning desire to spread the gift abroad” receive a great deal of “mental peace and moral satisfaction” when “humble black folk, voluble with thanks, receive barrels of old clothes from lordly and generous whites.” But when black recipients of white charity begin to challenge white authority and accept white “gifts” sullenly rather than gratefully, “then the spell is suddenly broken” and the true, even if unconscious purpose of white charity is revealed (1999, 19). It has very little to do with genuinely increasing the flourishing of black people, and everything to do with covertly using black people to generate white people’s moral sense of goodness.¶ Instead of “selflessly” working for others’ benefit, a person who wishes to support others’ flourishing needs to turn to herself first. “Heap[ing] up all riches in [her] soul,” as Nietzsche (1969, 100) explains, a person’s relationship to others would not be a stingy and starved love of her neighbors, but instead a bestowing love that is able to give abundantly to others because she was first generous with herself. It is an excess of power, a “power that seeks to overflow,” that enables a person to genuinely benefit another (1968a, 395). It is this type of power of which King speaks, for example, when he preaches about loving one’s enemies. This is a “love that will save our world and our civilization, love even for enemies,” because it is a love born of strength that thus “refus[es] to defeat any individual” (King 1957).

### Empathy Good

#### Our reclamation of white subjectivity creates the possibility of mutual empathy--- creates positive community--- ensures positive affect towards problems, key to social justice

Eze 2012 [Chielozona Eze (chieloz@yahoo.com) is Associate Professor of Postcolonial and World Literature at Northeastern Illinois University African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2012 “Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Empathy: Reflections on the Moral Conditions for Conflict Resolutions in Africa” Project Muse]

Mandela capitalized on white people’s expressions of sympathy and condolence. The white people’s sense of loss was proof of their capacity for empathy. Mandela therefore invited them to consider Hani’s death in light of the immense collective grief that their black compatriots had endured in the past. Chris Hani’s death therefore became symbolic of the black experience in South Africa. But Mandela was quick to acknowledge that the experience of pain was shared by black and white South Africans alike. For the first time in South African history, whites and blacks mourned an individual death officially and simultaneously. He therefore underlined the common humanity and the possibility of empathy.¶ Kenneth Zagacki argues that by acknowledging the right of South African blacks to mourn, by underlining this experience of pain and grief, and also by welcoming “the sympathy of whites, Mandela identified the ground for a kind of primordial reconciliation between the conflicted races, at least immediately after Hani’s murder” (2003: 721). The obvious implication in Mandela’s rhetoric is that if the white compatriots could be touched by Chris Hani’s death, there were chances that they could understand the injustices of the past. This implication is in line with Mandela’s liberal understanding of humanity as subject to [End Page 127] progress, or evolvement rather than being frozen in essentialism. As if borrowing from the Aristotelian understanding of virtue, Mandela appealed to his compatriots to do something: “Our decisions and actions will determine whether we use our pain, our grief and our outrage to move forward to what is the only lasting solution for our country” (2003: 471–72).¶ In at least two other speeches, Mandela subtly associated apartheid with patriarchy—another ideology under which humanity suffers. This, I think, was designed to find an inroad into the experiences of many white South Africans. As the leader of the new nation, he was intent on eliminating the two destructive ideologies, and to steer the nation out of its morass. In the context of the history of racial and patriarchal oppression, the white man was both the architect of apartheid and the uber- patriarch; the white woman, also a victim of patriarchy’s oppression, could help white society understand what blacks had been suffering under apartheid. Two such women were Helen Joseph and Ingrid Jonker.¶ Helen Joseph was a South African anti-apartheid activist, born in Easebourne, England, who graduated from King’s College London in 1927. She taught in India and came to live in Durban, South Africa, in 1930. She took a job with the Garment Workers Union (GWU) and came under the influence of Solly Sachs, among others. Her awareness of social injustice led her to becoming a founding member of the African National Congress (ANC)’s white ally, the Congress of Democrats (COD), and national secretary of Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) in the 1950s.1 . She suffered at the hands of the apartheid regime because of her activism. She passed away on December 25, 1992, in Johannesburg.¶ Mandela stressed the fact that Helen Joseph, a white woman, had much to teach the country that was then being born. She took a broad view of the directions that people should take in uniting South Africans. In his speech at her funeral, Mandela said that her political involvement was shaped by her experience working with Solly Sachs in the garment workers union (Mandela 2003: 473). It was here that she encountered the triple oppression suffered by South African women and the added repression that the pass laws brought to bear on the majority of black South Africans. Helen’s response to the pass laws was that they affected African men and women directly and oppressed all South Africans who were forced either to carry a pass or to watch others being persecuted¶ More than her lessons in unity, Helen Joseph’s greatest contribution, especially in regard to empathy, was the realization that the [End Page 128] victims of oppression were not the only ones who suffered; those who watched them being oppressed suffered too. It was therefore everyone’s obligation to end the system that brought oppression and misery to so many. In her view, no society could call itself civilized while any of its members lived under oppression. The pain of one is the pain of all because empathy links us all to a common fate.¶

**Our politics is necessary to celebrating life. The alternative denies our potential to affirm life and condemns others to unnecessary suffering.**

May ‘5 (Todd May, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531)

**To change the world and to celebrate life. This**, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, **is the struggle** within us. **It is a struggle in which** one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which **one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the** sake of the **other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for** the sake of **changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary.** In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to he revolutionarv. The matter is more urgent than that, however. **One cannot** be both sad and revolutionary lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is **focus**ed **only on the future; the present is** what is **to be overcome. The vision of what** is not but **must come to be overwhelms all** else, **and the point of change** itself **becomes lost**. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. **The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life**, although there are many who have chosen this path. **It is** at best **blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many** of our fellow humans, **to say nothing of what happens to** sentient **nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires** a **self-deception** that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, **it is anathema for all** of us **who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is** matched **only by** an equally expansive **disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life celebration and** the **desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability**. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. **The question** then **becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.** III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They’re dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They vary in age. You don’t know any of them. You’ve never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, ‘Tim!’ and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don’t want to be the first to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people filter in. You’re not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim’s arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your first time at a meeting like this. He doesn’t ask about politics but about where you’re from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you’re talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rectangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there’s something you don’t notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ IV **I can offer only a suggestion of an answer** here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to find the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker finishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, **the suggestion I would like to make** here **is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides** of this battle **at the same time**. Given the thinkers I have chosen as reference points, it will be no surprise when I say that that conception runs through the body. Let me start with Merleau-Ponty. In his last writings, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible, he offers a conception of the body that is neither at odds nor even entangled with the world, but is of the very world itself. His concept of the flesh introduces a point of contact that is also a point of undifferentiation. The flesh, Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, as tangible it descends among them’.2 We must recall this economy of the flesh before we turn to Foucault. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a single Being. Our world is of that Being, and we are of our world. We are not something that confronts the world from outside, but are born into it and do not leave it. This does not mean that we cannot remove ourselves from the immediacy of its grasp. What it means is that to remove ourselves from that immediacy is neither the breaking of a bond nor the discovery of an original dichotomy or dualism. What is remarkable about human beings is precisely our capacity to confront the world, to reflect upon it, understand it, and change it, while still being of a piece with it. To grasp this remarkable character, it is perhaps worth recalling Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the fold. The world is not composed of different parts; there is no transcendent, whether of God or of subjectivity. The world is one. As Deleuze sometimes says, being is univocal. This oneness is not, however, inert or inanimate. Among other things, it can fold over on itself, creating spaces that are at once insides and outsides, at once different from and continuous with one another. The flesh is a fold of Being in this sense. It is of the world, and yet encounters it as if from a perceptual or cognitive distance. It is a visibility that sees, a tangible that touches, an audible that hears. Merleau- Ponty writes: There is vision, touch when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact . . . and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them.3 For Merleau-Ponty, thought and reflection do not attach themselves to this flesh from beyond it, but arise through it. As our body is of this world, our thought is of our bodies, its language of a piece with the world it addresses. ‘[I]f we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it.’4 This conception of the body as flesh of the world is not foreign to Foucault, although of course the terms Merleau-Ponty uses are not his. We might read Foucault’s politics as starting from here, inaugurated at the point of undifferentiation between body and world. The crucial addition he would make is that that point of undifferentiation is not historically inert. The body/world nexus is inscribed in a history that leaves its traces on both at the same time, and that crosses the border of the flesh and reaches the language that arises from it, and the thought that language expresses. How does this work?V Maybe it doesn’t happen that way. Maybe it happens another way. Maybe you walk into a room at a local community center. The room is large, but there aren’t many people, at least yet. There’s a rectangular table in the center, and everyone is sitting around it. A couple of people look up as you walk in. They nod slightly. You nod back, even more slightly. At the head of the table is someone with a legal pad. She does not look up. She is reading the notes on the pad, making occasional marks with the pen in her right hand. Other people come in and take places at the table. One or two of them open laptop computers and look for an outlet. Eventually, the table fills up and people start sitting in chairs behind the table. Your feel as though you’re in an inner circle where you don’t belong. You wonder whether you should give up your chair and go sit on the outside with the others who are just coming in now. Maybe people notice you, think you don’t belong there. At this moment you’d like to leave. You begin to feel at once large and small, visually intrusive and an object of scrutiny. You don’t move because maybe this is OK after all. You just don’t know. The room is quiet. A couple of people cough. Then the woman seated at the head of the table looks up. She scans the room as if taking attendance. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ VI Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the body as flesh is an ontological one. Although he does not see the body as remote from its historical inscription, his discussion does not incorporate the role such inscription plays. **For a body to be of the world is** also **for it to be temporal**, to be **encrusted in the continuous emerging of the world** over time. And **this** emerging **is not abstract;** rather, **it is concrete. The body/world nexus evolves during particular historical periods.** This fold of the flesh, this body, is not nowhere and at any time. It is there, then; or it is here, now. **A body is entangled within a web of specific events and relations that, precisely because it is of this world, are inescapably a part of that body’s destiny.** As Merleau-Ponty tells us in Phenomenology of Perception, ‘our open and personal existence rests on an initial foundation of acquired and stabilized existence. But it could not be otherwise, if we are temporality, since the dialectic of acquisition and future is what constitutes time.’5 **The medium for the body’s insertion into a particular net of events** and relations **is that of social practices. Our bodies are not first and foremost creatures of the state** or the economy, **no more than they are atomized** wholes **distinct from the world they inhabit.** Or better, **they are creatures of the state** and the economy **inasmuch as those appear through social practices, through** the **everyday practices** that are the ether of our lives. Social practices are the sedimentation of history at the level of the body. When I teach, when I write this article, when I run a race or teach one of my children how to ride a bicycle, my body is oriented in particular ways, conforming to or rejecting particular norms, responding to the constraints and restraints of those practices as they have evolved in interaction with other practices over time. Through its engagement in these practices, my body has taken on a history that is not of my making but is nevertheless part of my inheritance. It is precisely because, as Merleau-Ponty has written, the body and the world are not separate things but rather in a chiasmic relation that we can think this inheritance. And it is because of Foucault’s histories that we can recognize that this inheritance is granted through specific social practices. And of course, as Foucault has taught us, social practices are where the power is. It is not, or not simply, at the level of the state or the modes of production where power arises. It is, as he sometimes puts it, at the capillaries. One of the lessons of Discipline and Punish is that, if the soul is the prison of the body, this is because the body is inserted into a set of practices that create for it a soul. These practices are not merely the choices of an individual whose thought surveys the world from above, but instead the fate of a body that is of a particular world at a particular time and place. Moreover, these practices are not merely in service to a power that exists outside of them; they are mechanisms of power in their own right. It is not because Jeremy Bentham disliked the prison population that the Panopticon became a grid for thinking about penal institutions. It is instead because the evolution of penal practices at that time created an opening for the economy of visibility that the Panopticon represented. When Foucault writes that . . . the soul has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives6 his claim is informed by four other ones that lie behind it: that bodies are of a piece with the world, that the body/world nexus is a temporal one, that the medium of that corporeal temporality is the practices a body is engaged in, and that that medium is political as well as social. The last three claims are, of course, of the framework of Foucault’s thought. The first one is the ontological scaffolding provided by Merleau-Ponty. And it is by means of all four that we can begin to conceive things so as to be able to choose both world-changing and lifecelebrating at the same time. VII It could happen yet another way. Increasingly, it does. There is no meeting. There are no tables and no legal pads. Nobody sits down in a room together, at least nobody sits down at a place you know about. There may not even be a leaflet. Maybe you just got an email that was forwarded by someone you know slightly and who thought you might be interested. At the bottom there’s a link, in case you want to unsubscribe. If you don’t unsubscribe you get more notices, with petitions to sign or times and places for rallies or teach-ins or marches. Maybe there’s also a link for feedback or a list for virtual conversations or suggestions. If you show up, it’s not to something you put together but to something that was already in place before you arrived. How did you decide on this rally or teach-in? You sat in front of your computer screen, stared at it, pondering. Maybe you emailed somebody you know, asking for their advice. Is it worth going? If it’s on campus you probably did. It matters who will see you, whether you have tenure, how much you’ve published. There are no Tims here. You’ve decided to go. If it’s a teach-in, you’ve got plausible deniability; you’re just there as an observer. If it’s a rally, you can stand to the side. But maybe you won’t do that. The issue is too important. You don’t know the people who will be there, but you will stand among them, walk among them. You will be with them, in some way. Bodies at the same time and place. You agree on the issue, but it’s a virtual agreement, one that does not come through gestures or words but through sharing the same values and the same internet connections. As you march, as you stand there, nearly shoulder to shoulder with others of like mind, you’re already somewhere else, telling this story to someone you know, trying to get them to understand the feeling of solidarity that you are projecting back into this moment. You say to yourself that maybe you should have brought a friend along. **There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating.** Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body’s chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. **The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers** in his late work **is one of wonder. Abandoning** the **sterile philosophical debates** about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, **his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact with all** of **its aspects.** No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed creatures of the philosophical tradition. **We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it.** Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our faculties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, ‘I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.’7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has filtered through the practices of my employment, of my students’ upbringing, and of my family’s expectations of themselves and one another. **The vulnerability of the body**, then, **is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable.** We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the first volume of the History of Sexuality. **If we are a product of our practices and** the **conception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered,** so **to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and**, inseparably, for **conceiving the world**. To experiment in sexuality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And **because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel, and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world.** Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. **Here**, I take it, **is where** the idea of **freedom** in Foucault **lies**. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we find ourselves. **To seek** our **freedom** in a space **apart from our encrustation in the world is not** so much **to liberate ourselves from its influence as to build our own private prison.** Foucault once said: There’s an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn’t be better. **My optimism would consist** rather **in saying that so many things can be changed**, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, **more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . .8 That is where to discover our freedom.** And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? **There is**, after all, **always a next.** If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – **there is always more to do**. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren’t in Tibet, even if they aren’t Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What’s the next move in this campaign, what’s the next campaign? **Isn’t there more going on than that?** After all, **engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It’s where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others** (many of whom you will never meet, even if it’s for their sake that you’re involved) and the buildings and streets of your town **is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion** in a meeting **or** singing at a rally or **marching** in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, **is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life**, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? **The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing.** Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. **Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the** historically fragile and contingent **ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it.** If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then **our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings.** Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. **There is an ontology of freedom at work here,** one **that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture,** as there is to a painting, **than appears to us on the surface** of its visibility. **The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives.** And **that is why,** in the end, **there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself,** this time at a new point, **to see what that might yield. There is,** as Foucault often reminds us, **no guarantee** that **this fold will not** itself **turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world** with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, **there is no certainty about the results of our experiments.** Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. **But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it.** And **to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.**  **If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world,** then perhaps **the best place to begin** to think **is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change**, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. **So how might you be a political body, woven into the fabric of the world as a celebrator and as a changer?** **You went to the meeting, and then to the demonstration. How was it there?** Were the bodies in harmony or in counterpoint? Did you sing with your feet, did your voice soar? Did your mind come alive? Did you see possibilities you had not seen before? Were there people whose words or clothes, or even the way they walked hand in hand (how long has it been since you’ve walked hand in hand with someone out in public?) offer you a possibility, or make you feel alive as well as righteous? And how about those people off to the side, the ones on the sidewalk watching? Maybe they just stared, or maybe nodded as you went past. Or maybe some of them shouted at you to stop blocking the streets with your nonsense. Did you recoil within yourself, see yourself as in a mirror, or as the person at Sartre’s keyhole who’s just been caught? Did you feel superior to them, smug in your knowledge? Or did they, too, show you something you might learn from? Are they you at another moment, a moment in the past or in the future? Are they your parents that you have not explained to, sat down beside, or just shared a meal with? That one over there, the old man slightly stooped in the long overcoat: whom does he remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? **You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations**. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you’re involved in a political campaign. **By then you may have stopped asking why**. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? **Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends?** And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience**. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends**. Other means/ends. **Some people ride bicycles, en masse**, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. **Some people** have gone to Palestine in order to **put their bodies between** the **Palestinians and** the **Israeli soldiers** and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family’s olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one’s body can be like this. **To resist, to celebrate, is** also **to be vulnerable.** The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And **so you experiment. You try this and you try that.** You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. **There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to** keep vigilant, **seek**ing **the possibilities without scorning the realities.** **It’s a difficult balance. You can neglect it** if you like. Many do. **But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies**, animate and inanimate. **Whether you like it or not**, whether you **recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.**

#### Empathy is individually liberating – allows VTL and invests in disregard for egoism and marginalization.

Darnell L. Moore On Love, Empathy, and Pleasure in the Age of Neoliberalism

July 9, 2013 <http://thefeministwire.com/2013/07/on-love-empathy-and-pleasure-in-the-age-of-neoliberalism/>

On Empathy. Empathy is a feeling and an enactment of intentional regard for others. It is a positively antagonistic and radical energy in an isolationist culture that promotes self-centeredness. Wenshu Lee, again, reminds us that present within neoliberal govermentality is an “isolating force.” Empathy frustrates that force because empathy excites engagement: it is a liberating posture. If love is the elimination of the expansive spaces that may separate us, then empathy might very well be understood as the position we must take when the distance is cleared: the movement from the position of egotism to thoughtful concern of the other; the movement from our contented social locations to that of dislocation; the examination of our excess, access, and privileges as possible contributing factors for the denials, lack, and experiences of marginalization in the lives of others; analyses of our various oppressions and the ways we might also oppress. Neoliberalism does not seek to wholly extinguish our affective energies, however. Instead, neoliberalism seeks to re-route our energies to other more valuable and profitable sources, namely, goods, and even “the good” when it too is profitable.

### Alt

#### Abandonment of empathy causes extinction

Huffington 2010 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/only-empathy-can-save-us_b_447685.html>

For this month's HuffPost Book Club, I have chosen a big book -- both figuratively and literally. Jeremy Rifkin's The Empathic Civilization clocks in at close to 700 pages and sets out to present nothing less than -- as Rifkin puts it -- "a new rendering of human history and the meaning of human existence." This alternative history focuses not on the conflicts, antagonisms, and power struggles that have marked human progress, but on "the empathic evolution of the human race and the profound ways it has shaped our development and will likely decide our fate as a species." Empathy, Rifkin tells us -- and backs up with new scientific data -- is not a quaint behavior trotted out during intermittent visits to a food bank or during the Haiti telethon. Instead, it lies at the very core of human existence. This is something I've long believed. Indeed, I dedicated a whole book to exploring what I called The Fourth Instinct -- that part of the human character that compels us to go beyond our impulses for survival, sex, and power, and drives us to expand the boundaries of our caring to include our communities and the world around us. 2010-02-03-empathic.jpgAnd, in the 15 years since then -- and especially since the economic meltdown -- the role empathy plays in our lives has only grown more important. In fact, in this time of economic hardship, political instability, and rapid technological change, empathy is the one quality we most need if we're going to survive and flourish in the 21st century. It's important to keep in mind what empathy is -- and what it's not. It's different than sympathy, which is passive. "Empathy," explains Rifkin, "conjures up active engagement -- the willingness of an observer to become part of another's experience, to share the feeling of that experience." But empathy is not just about feeling for another's suffering. As Rifkin points out: "One can also empathize with another's joy." Indeed, according to Rifkin, "empathic moments are the most intensely alive experiences we ever have. We empathize with each other's struggles against death and for life. One acknowledges the whiff of death in another's frailties and vulnerabilities. No one ever empathizes with a perfect being." As he does in all of his work, Rifkin really swings for the fences in The Empathic Civilization, challenging us all to rise above the clutter of our daily lives, and explore life's larger questions. He is that rare breed, one whose disappearance is often and rightly bemoaned: a public intellectual. Or, as the New York Times once called him: "a social and ethical prophet." Aside from authoring 17 bestselling books, he's the president of the Foundation on Economic Trends, an advisor to the European Union, and a senior lecturer at Wharton's Executive Education Program. I chose The Empathic Civilization as this month's selection because, besides being a brilliant read and offering a vitally important perspective, it is the perfect companion piece to last month's selection, Janine Wedel's Shadow Elite: How the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market. While Shadow Elite lays out precisely who and what currently have a stranglehold on our political system, The Empathic Civilization shows us the way to decisively break that hold. Rifkin divides the book into three parts. The first takes a look at the new scientific discoveries that lead to the conclusion that rather than being naturally aggressive, acquisitive, and self-involved, humans are "a fundamentally empathic species" -- what Rifkin calls Homo empathicus. The second part charts the development of human empathy, "from the rise of the great theological civilizations to the ideological age that dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the psychological era that characterized much of the twentieth century," and the emerging trends of the 21st century. In the third part of the book, Rifkin focuses on the nascent Third Industrial Revolution and the rise of The Age of Empathy. According to Rifkin, the progress of civilization has been a constant struggle between empathy -- increased human connection -- and entropy, the deterioration of the health of the planet. It is, quite literally, a race against time. "We are on the cusp of an epic shift," he writes. "The Age of Reason is being eclipsed by the Age of Empathy." Rifkin believes this age will be defined by how well we navigate the massive changes in both information and energy technologies. He explains that every great leap forward in civilization has involved a combination of a communications revolution along with an energy revolution. For instance, the advent of the printing press provided the "means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution." And each one of these leaps expands the circle of empathy -- from tribes, to nation-states, to continents and, if we're lucky, to the entire world.

# 1AR

### A2 Self-Love = White Supremacy

#### White self-love doesn’t re-enforce white supremacy, it is a prerequisite to overcoming it

Sullivan 2012 (Shannon Sullivan, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Philosophy Department Head at Penn State University, “On the Need for a New Ethos of White Antiracism,” PhiloSOPHIA, Vol 2, Issue 1, Muse)

What is true about Nietzsche’s “virtuous” person is true of the “virtuous” white person as well. The white person who is best able to work against white racism in solidarity with people of color isn’t “good.” Neither is she “bad” or “evil” in the sense of flippantly disregarding racial matters or deliberately committing racist acts. We might say that she instead is a person who is constituted by a loving affirmation of herself and other white people, one that exercises and strengthens her positive rather than negative affects regarding race and thus allows her to digest, rather than resentfully fester over, impotently avoid, or evasively deflect her and other white people’s roles in racist institutions and histories.11 Admittedly, from a dominant moral perspective, this self-affirmation might look evil, or at least extremely inappropriate. But I think it is one of the tools that white people most need if they are going to be useful and effective in struggles against white racism. I reject the assumption that positive affects and the pursuit of social justice necessarily conflict with one another. To the extent that dominant moral perspectives make that assumption, then “morality is one of the main obstacles to racial change,” and in that case white people need to “relinquis[h] our cherished notions of morality . . . [including] how we understand what it means to be a good person” (Thompson 2003, 18, 16).¶ Lest the “immoralism” of this claim sound too alarming, let me underscore again that affect is ontological and agential—it is not “mere” feeling—and thus that positive affects do not necessarily involve feeling happy.12 (Recall here Nietzsche’s scorn for the happiness promoted by utilitarianism and desired by the last man [Nietzsche 1968a, 343, and 1969, 46–47].) While happiness may feel good, its good feeling is somewhat irrelevant to the matter at hand. The question instead is, What does an affect move a person to do? Calling for white people to be constituted by vitalizing affects, such as self-love, is not a call for them to feel delighted about being white racists or benefiting from white privilege. In the mix of negative and positive affects that make up white people—even, or perhaps especially, when the negative far outweigh the positive—it is a call for them to nourish their positive affects with regard [End Page 32] to whiteness so that a different kind of political and personal action on their part will be possible.¶ Positive affects are an effect—as well as a cause, in an ongoing transformational spiral—of an affective-ontological reconfiguration of a being’s relations with other beings in which the active thriving of one is intimately linked to the active thriving of others. This spiral of transactional relations suggests why it is not just the case that one’s own weakness often contributes to the destruction of others, but also that destruction of others feeds into one’s own weakness, and so on. From this perspective, we could say, as James Baldwin does in the epigraph above, that what is truly sinister about white people is their lack of joy and other positive affects. Writing about the destructiveness of white people’s guilt, in particular, Baldwin (1969, 321) continues: “The fact that [white people] have not yet been able to do this—to face their history, to change their lives—hideously menaces this country [the United States]. Indeed, it menaces the entire world.” probably It’s likely that multiple kinds of positive affect will be needed to fully change white people’s lives and drastically reduce their menace to the world. The task is that large. Instead of being constituted by negative affects, even the seemingly beneficial ones of white guilt and shame, white people need to develop positive affects with regard to their race. Those affects will be beneficial to both white people and people of color, and perhaps even the entire world.